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ABSTRACT:  This paper examines whether terrorism is an effective tool to achieve 
political goals.  By exploiting variation in terror attacks over time and across locations in 
Israel from 1984 to 2006, we show that local terror attacks cause Israelis to be: (i) more 
willing to grant territorial concessions to the Palestinians; (ii) more willing to accept a 
Palestinian state; (iii) less likely to identify oneself as being right-wing; and (iv) more 
likely to have a favorable opinion of Arabs.  These effects are especially pronounced for 
individuals from particular demographic groups which are typically right-wing in their 
political views.  In addition, we show that terror induces Israelis to vote increasingly for 
right-wing parties.  This pattern of results demonstrates that right-wing parties are 
becoming more accommodating to Palestinian demands for territorial concessions.   
Hence, this paper shows that terrorism appears to be an effective strategy in terms of 
shifting the entire Israeli political landscape to the left.  These findings may shed light on 
the causes underlying the spread of global terrorism in the last few decades. 
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1. Introduction 
Terrorism is one of the most important, and yet complex issues facing a large 
number of countries throughout the world.  In recent years, several papers have analyzed 
the underlying causes and consequences of terrorism, as well as the strategies used by 
terror organizations in the pursuit of their goals.
1  However, very little attention has been 
given to the question of whether terrorism works or not with respect to coercing the 
targeted country to grant political and/or territorial concessions.  The lack of research on 
this subject is surprising, given that the answer to this question is critical to understanding 
why terror exists at all, and why it appears to be increasing over time in many parts of the 
world.   
This paper is the first to analyze whether terrorism is an effective strategy using a 
large sample of micro data and paying particular attention to establishing causality.
2  To 
do this, we exploit variation in a large number of terror attacks over time and across 
locations in Israel from 1984 to 2006, and examine whether local terror attacks cause 
Israeli citizens to become more willing to grant territorial concessions to the Palestinians. 
In addition, we examine whether terror attacks cause Israelis to change their preferences 
over political parties, attitudes towards establishing a Palestinian state, and whether or not 
                                                  
1 For the causes of terrorism, see Abadie (2006), Berrebi (2007), Krueger and Laitin (2008), Krueger and 
Maleckova (2003), Li (2005) and Piazza (2008).  For the consequences of terrorism, see two recent surveys 
by Krueger (2007) and Enders and Sandler (2007), as well as Gould and Stecklov (2008) and Becker and 
Rubinstein (2008) among many others.  For the strategies of terrorist groups, see Benmelech and Berrebi 
(2007), Benmelech et al. (2009), Berman and Laitin (2008, 2005), Berrebi and Klor (2006), Bloom (2005), 
Bueno de Mesquita (2005a), Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007), Kydd and Walter (2006, 2002). 
2 As Abrahms (2007) points out, the effectiveness of terrorism can be measured in terms of its “combat 
effectiveness” and it “strategic effectiveness.”  The former refers to the amount of physical damage and 
human casualties resulting from terror activity, while the latter refers to whether terror is able to achieve 
political goals.  The focus of our research is to assess the “strategic effectiveness” of terror.  The “combat 
effectiveness” of terrorism is well established from the mounting body counts around the world.    3
they have a negative opinion of Arabs.  Our results indicate that terror attacks have 
pushed Israelis leftward in their political opinions towards the Palestinians and made 
them more likely to support granting concessions.  As a result, this paper presents the 
first comprehensive analysis showing that terrorism can be an effective strategy.   
However, our findings also indicate that terrorism beyond a certain threshold can backfire 
on the political goals of terrorist factions, by reducing the targeted population’s 
willingness to make political and/or territorial concessions.   
As stated above, the existing evidence on the effectiveness of terrorism is sparse.  
In the political science literature, there are currently two opposing views regarding this 
issue.  The first one claims that terrorism is rising around the world simply because it 
works.  Most notably, Pape (2003, 2005) claims that terrorists achieved “significant 
policy changes” in six of the eleven terrorist campaigns that he analyzed.  In addition, 
Pape (2003, 2005) argues that terrorism is particularly effective against democracies 
because the electorate typically is highly sensitive to civilian casualties from terrorist 
acts, which induces their leaders to grant concessions to terrorist factions.  Authoritarian 
regimes, in contrast, are responsive only to the preferences of the ruling elite, and 
therefore, are less likely to accede to terrorist demands in response to civilian casualties.
3 
                                                  
3 To provide empirical support for this theory, Pape (2003, 2005) shows that democracies are 
disproportionately more likely to be the victim of an international suicide terror attack.  Karol and Miguel 
(2007) provide empirical support to voters’ sensitivity to terrorism by showing that American casualties in 
Iraq caused George Bush to receive significantly fewer votes in several key states in the 2004 elections, 
thus underscoring the effectiveness of the Iraqi insurgency to influence political outcomes in the United 
States.  Eubank and Weinberg (2001) and Weinberg and Eubank (1994) also show that democracies are 
more likely to host terror groups and be the target of terror attacks.  They claim that terrorism is particularly 
effective against democracies due to constitutional constraints that limit retaliation policies against 
terrorism in these types of regimes.    4
The opposing theory argues not only that there is very little evidence showing that 
terrorism is effective (Abrahms, 2006), but that in fact terror is not an effective tool.
4  
Abrahms (2006) examined twenty-eight terrorist groups, and argues that terrorists 
achieved their political goals only 7 percent of the time (in contrast to the more than 50 
percent success rate reported in Pape (2003) with a different sample).  Moreover, he 
argues that terrorism against democracies is ineffective because democracies are more 
effective in counter-terrorism.  In support of this claim, Abrahms (2007) presents 
evidence that democracies are less likely to be the target of terror activities than illiberal 
countries, and that democracies are less likely to make territorial or ideological 
concessions.  Using the WITTS data base of international and domestic terror incidents 
from 2004 to midway through 2005, Abrahms (2007) shows that terror incidents decline 
with the level of a country’s “freedom index,” and that the freedom index is uncorrelated 
with the level of casualties from terror.  In particular, Abrahms (2007) shows that, among 
the ten countries with the highest number of terror casualties, only two are “free 
countries” (India and Philippines), while the rest are “not free” (Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Russia, and Pakistan) or “partially free” (Nigeria, Nepal, Columbia, and Uganda).
5  This 
evidence leads Abrahms (2007) to conclude that terrorism is not an effective strategy 
against democratic countries. 
Therefore, a summary of the literature reveals that there are very few studies that 
have even attempted to analyze the strategic effectiveness of terrorism, and little 
                                                  
4 Abrahms (2007) criticizes the analysis in Pape (2003) for being based on very few countries.  Out of the 
eleven terrorist campaigns that Pape (2003) analyzed, six were based in Israel while four of the remaining 
five were composed of Turkey or Sri Lanka. 
5 The evidence in Abrahms (2007) notwithstanding, the findings of Abadie (2006), Blomberg and Hess 
(2005), and Krueger and Laitin (2008) suggest that political reforms towards more democratic forms of 
government are associated with an increase in terrorist activity.  Jackson Wade and Reiter (2007) dispute 
this claim.   5
agreement among those that have.  Thus, the question of whether terror is effective or not 
is not only an important one in terms of understanding why terrorism exists, it is still very 
much an open question in terms of the evidence.  Furthermore, as described above, the 
existing evidence is based on analyzing a small sample of countries and making 
assessments about the success of terror campaigns against them [Pape (2003, 2005) and 
Abrahms (2006, 2007)].  However, comparisons across countries are problematic for a 
number of reasons.  First, it is difficult to control for all the factors that may be correlated 
with the level of terrorism, political stability, level of freedom, etc.  All of these factors 
are most likely to be endogenously determined, and jointly influenced by geography, 
colonial history, ethnic composition, and religious affiliation.  Second, terrorist groups 
may be emerging endogenously in certain countries according to the success rate of other 
strategies, and according to the expected success rate of terrorist strategies (Iyengar and 
Monten, 2008).  In addition, one cannot ignore the fact that most of the countries (listed 
above) that suffer high levels of terror are near each other geographically and share 
similar characteristics in terms of long-standing border conflicts intermixed with ethnic 
and religious tensions.  Controlling for these factors is difficult to do in a cross-section of 
countries, making it problematic to infer causality from the existing evidence.  Finally, it 
is often difficult to assess whether terror is effective when the goals of the terrorists are 
not even clear.  For example, it is not easy to define the political goals of the September 
11 attacks.  Therefore, it is nearly impossible to apply a standard definition of “success” 
when you compare terrorist groups across different countries.  
In this paper, we overcome the empirical obstacles mentioned above by focusing 
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and using individual-level data on the political attitudes   6
of Israelis towards making concessions to the Palestinians.  Our focus on one conflict 
allows us to abstract from the empirical difficulties associated with controlling for all the 
factors which could be influencing the presence and effectiveness of terror across 
countries.  In addition, restricting our analysis to one conflict enables us to avoid the 
difficult task of trying to create objective and consistent measures about whether terror 
seems to be effective across different conflicts, which are often not comparable to one 
another.
6 
Using repeated cross-sections of Jewish Israelis (not including those in the West 
Bank or Gaza Strip) from 1988 to 2006, we control for subdistrict fixed-effects and 
aggregate year effects, and test whether variation in the level of terror across subdistricts 
over time can explain variation across subdistricts over time in political attitudes.  We 
pay particular attention to distinguishing between political attitudes and party 
preferences, which is important because the platforms of parties could be endogenous to 
the level of terror.   
Our results show that terrorism significantly affects the preferences and attitudes 
of Jewish Israelis.  Local terror attacks induce the local population to exhibit (i) a higher 
willingness to grant territorial concessions; (ii) an increase in their willingness to accept a 
Palestinian state; (iii) a decrease in the probability of identifying oneself as being right-
                                                  
6 Terror factions are intricate and multifaceted organizations.  There is a growing consensus that terror 
organizations strategically choose their target and their operatives [Benmelech and Berrebi (2007), 
Benmelech et al. (2009), Berman and Laitin (2005, 2008), Bueno de Mesquita (2005a)].  The main goals 
behind terror campaigns, however, are not always clear or well defined, and seem to differ not only across 
conflicts, but even over time for any given terror organization (Kydd and Walter, 2006).  There are claims, 
for example, that terror campaigns are sometimes geared to spoil peace processes (Kydd and Walter, 2002) 
or to bolster the level of support terror groups receive within a population they claim to represent [Bueno 
de Mesquita and Dickson (2007), Bloom (2005)].  Alternative goals notwithstanding, the main objective of 
the majority of terror campaigns is to impose costs on the targeted population to pressure a government into 
granting political and/or territorial concessions. A large number of articles can be cited in support of this 
claim. For formal theoretical models see, for example, Lapan and Sandler (1993), Bueno de Mesquita 
(2005b), and Berrebi and Klor (2006).    7
wing; and (iv) a more favorable opinion of Arabs.  However, the effects of terrorism are 
non-linear – terror makes Israelis more accommodating up to a certain point, but beyond 
this threshold, more terror attacks harden the stance of Israelis towards making 
concessions.  That said, our findings indicate that Palestinian factions target the Israeli 
population in a strategically successful way by spreading the attacks across localities so 
that they rarely reach the critical threshold in any given locality.  As a result, the total 
effect of terror on the preferences of the Israeli population is almost always towards 
moderation.  The only exception occurred in Jerusalem before the elections of 2003, 
where the number of terror fatalities went beyond the threshold level.  Hence, these 
findings lead to the conclusion that terror attacks have been strategically efficient in 
coercing Israelis to support territorial concessions. 
At the same time, we find some evidence that terror increases the likelihood that 
voters support right-wing parties (similar to Berrebi and Klor (2008)).  This result, 
however, does not contradict our finding that terror causes moderation.  The evidence 
suggests that terrorism brought about a leftward shift of the entire political map in Israel 
over the last 20 years, including the positions of right-wing parties who are traditionally 
less willing to grant territorial concessions to the Palestinians.  This finding highlights 
how critical it is to distinguish between the effects of terror on political attitudes versus 
its effects on party preferences, since the platforms of parties are moving endogenously in 
response to terrorism.  Therefore, our overall results show that terrorism has been an 
effective weapon in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  As such, these findings suggest that 
terrorism may be increasing over time and spreading to other regions, precisely because it 
appears to be a successful strategy to achieve political goals.    8
 
2.  The Data 
2.1  Data on the Political Attitudes of Israeli Citizens 
Our analysis uses data on the political attitudes of Jewish Israeli citizens (which 
do not reside in Gaza and the West Bank) along with data on the occurrences of terror 
attacks.  The data on the attitudes of Israeli citizens come from The Israel National 
Election Studies (INES), which contain surveys carried-out before every Parliamentary 
election in Israel since 1969.
7  These surveys are based on a representative sample of 
Israeli voters, and focus on a wide array of substantive issues affecting Israeli society (see 
Arian and Shamir (2008) for the latest edited volume of studies based on the INES data).  
For example, the surveys include questions about economic and political values, trust in 
government, social welfare, and the desired relationship between state and religion.  In 
addition, there are several questions regarding the political preferences of the respondent 
and his or her preferred policy position regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Since our goal is to understand changes over time in the political opinions of 
Israelis, our analysis focuses on the questions that appear repeatedly across surveys for 
the six parliamentary elections from 1988 until 2006.  These include questions regarding 
which party the voter is supporting in the upcoming elections, his or her self-described 
political tendency (from right wing to left wing), and whether the voter has a favorable 
opinion about Arabs.
8  In addition, the survey asks whether the respondent favors 
                                                  
7 The INES questionnaires and data are available online at the INES’ website (www.ines.tau.ac.il). 
8 The question does not clarify whether it refers to Arabs who are citizens of the State of Israel and reside 
inside the green line, Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or Arabs in general, regardless of place 
of residence.    9
granting territorial concessions to the Palestinians as part of a peace agreement, and 
whether Israel should agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state.  
The surveys also contain a rich set of demographic information such as: gender, 
age, education level, ethnicity, immigrant status, monthly expenditures, and notably, the 
location of residence for each respondent.  This information is particularly important for 
our identification strategy since we do not want to rely on aggregate time trends to 
identify the causal effect of terror on political attitudes.  Instead, we control for aggregate 
time trends and exploit the geographic variation in terror attacks across 18 different sub-
districts to explain the changes in political attitudes across these geographic areas.    
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the attitudes of Jewish Israeli citizens, 
computed separately for each sample year.  The main variable of interest refers to the 
respondent’s willingness to make territorial concessions to Palestinians.  This question 
appears in every survey, though not in the same format.  In the surveys from 1988 and 
1992, individuals were asked to consider three options regarding the long-term solution 
for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  We coded the person as being willing to make 
concessions if he/she chose the option: “In return for a peace agreement, a return of most 
of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.”
9  In the surveys from 1996 and 1999, individuals 
were asked to rank from 1 to 7 how much they agree (1 refers to “strongly disagree” and 
7 refers to “strongly agree”) to the question: “Israel should give back territories to the 
Palestinians for peace.”  We coded individuals as being willing to make concessions if 
they chose five or above to the seven-scale question.  Finally, in 2003 and 2006, 
individuals were given four options regarding their opinion on: “To what extent do you 
                                                  
9 The other two options available in the survey are “Annexation of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip” and 
“Status quo, keeping the present situation as it is.”   10
agree or disagree to exchange territories for peace?”  The four options were: strongly 
agree, agree, disagree, and strongly disagree.  We coded individuals as being willing to 
make concessions if they responded with “agree” or “strongly agree.”  
This variable is our main variable of interest because it unequivocally captures the 
respondent's willingness to grant territorial concessions to the Palestinians, which is 
consistent with the goals of the terrorist factions.  For example, Abdel Karim Aweis, a 
leader of the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades (one of the factions linked to the Fatah 
movement), asserted in an interview with the New York Times that “The goal of his 
group was to increase losses in Israel to a point at which the Israeli public would demand 
a withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip” (Greenberg, 2002).   
Table 1 shows an upward trend over time in the willingness of Israelis to make 
concessions – from 38% in 1988 to 56% in 2006.  However, since there were changes in 
the structure of the question over time, we employ several strategies to show that our 
results do not come from those changes.  First, all of the regressions control for year 
effects, which should neutralize any year-specific effect of how individuals interpreted 
the question.  Second, since the major change to the wording occurred between 1992 and 
1996, we show that the results are virtually identical using all of the surveys (1988-2006) 
or restricting the analysis to the 1996-2006 surveys.  Third, it is not entirely clear whether 
those who responded with a “four” on the seven point scale in 1996 and 1999 should be 
considered willing to make concessions or not.  Therefore, we show that the results are 
very similar if we code them as being willing to make concessions or unwilling to make 
concessions.    11
Table 1 also shows the evolution over time of the other variables used to measure 
the reaction of Israelis to terror attacks.  One measure is the person’s willingness to agree 
to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories as part of a peace settlement. 
This question included four options (strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly 
disagree) regarding the person’s willingness to “establish a Palestinian state as part of a 
permanent solution to the conflict.”  We divided the sample into two groups by coding 
together individuals that agree or strongly agree with the creation of a Palestinian state, 
versus individuals that disagree or strongly disagree with this position.  Table 1 shows 
that the proportion of individuals that agree or strongly agree with the creation of a 
Palestinian state monotonically increases from 0.26 in 1988 to 0.66 in 2006.
10  
The third variable in Table 1 refers to the respondent’s self-classification across 
the left-right political spectrum.  If the respondent defined himself/herself as being on the 
“right” or “moderate right” end of the spectrum, then he/she was coded as identifying 
with a right-wing political tendency.
11  Table 1 depicts a generally downward trend in the 
percent of self-described “right-wingers” between 1988 and 2006, although there was a 
short-lived increase from 1999 to 2003.  Another measure of political opinions in Table 1 
describes whether the respondent reported having an unfavorable opinion of Arabs.
12  
                                                  
10 One possible caveat of this question is that the survey does not provide a clear definition of “territories.”  
As a consequence, respondents may interpret that territories relate to areas already under the control of the 
Palestinian Authority.  If that is the case, for these respondents, the creation of a Palestinian state does not 
really entail any further territorial concessions.  In our sample, 25% of the individuals that agree to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state do not agree to further territorial concessions.  They comprise 12% of 
the entire sample.  
11 The exact wording of the question is “With which political tendency do you identify?” It included seven 
possible answers: left, moderate left, center, moderate right, right, religious, and none of them.  We 
classified and individual as identifying with the right-wing political tendency if the individual’s answer to 
this question was “moderate right” or “right.” 
12 This question presents the individuals with a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 represents “hate” and 10 
represents “love” for Arabs.  We classified an individual as having an unfavorable opinion of Arabs if 
he/she chose option 1.  This answer was chosen by 37.72 percent of the individuals in our sample.  Options 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 were each chosen by roughly 10 percent of the sample.  Options 6 to 9 were seldom   12
This measure shows a great deal of variation over time, with negative opinions showing a 
significant increase in particularly violent years (1996 and 2003). 
Finally, our last outcome measure depicts whether the individual intends to vote 
for a party belonging to the “right-wing bloc” in the upcoming parliamentary elections.  
The surveys ask every individual: “If the elections for the Knesset (Israeli parliament) 
were held today, for which party would you vote?”  We assign parties to the right-bloc 
following the categorization developed by Shamir and Arian (1999).  According to their 
definition, the right-bloc of parties includes the Likud party, all of the religious parties, 
all of the nationalist parties (Tzomet, Moledet, National Union), and parties identified 
with Russian immigrants.  We choose to focus on the right bloc instead of on separate 
parties, since the number of small parties and the electoral system were not constant 
across each election period.
13 
Table 1 shows that the support for the right bloc of political parties fluctuates over 
time in a similar fashion to the self-described right-wing political tendency.  We observe 
a steady decrease in the support for the right bloc of parties between 1988 and 1999, with 
an increase in 2003 followed by a sharp decrease in 2006 (due to the appearance of 
Kadima, a new centrist party, in those elections).   
Table 2 depicts the political attitudes of respondents tabulated by their 
demographic characteristics.  The table shows that (i) men and women share similar 
political preferences; (ii) the willingness to make concessions (and other left-leaning 
                                                                                                                                                  
chosen, with an aggregate frequency below 8 percent.  Using alternative definitions that include options 2 
and 3 as unfavorable opinion of Arabs does not qualitatively affect any of our results.  
13 Contrary to the other elections, the parliamentary elections of 1996 and 1999 allowed for split-ticket 
voting, whereby each voter cast a ballot in support of a political party for the parliamentary elections and a 
different ballot for the elections for Prime Minister.  This different system may have had an effect on the 
relative support obtained by the different parties.  Consequently, political preferences for these elections 
may not be directly comparable at the party level to voter preferences in the parliamentary elections of 
1988, 1992, 2003, and 2006.   13
views) increases with age, education, and with the degree of being secular (versus 
religious); (iii) individuals with an Asia-Africa family background (Sephardic Jews) are 
more likely to oppose concessions and support parties in the right bloc; and (iv) there are 
no clear differences between the attitudes of immigrants and those of individuals born in 
Israel. 
Overall, the data displays a tendency for Israelis to become more accommodating 
in their views over time – more willing to grant concessions, less “right-wing” in their 
own self-description, and more amenable to the creation of a Palestinian state.   
Interestingly, an increase in the willingness to grant concessions occurred even within 
individuals that consider themselves “right-wing.”  This pattern is shown in Figures 1 and 
2.  Although there were changes in the composition of people that define themselves as 
being right-wing over time, these figures highlight the general shift in the political 
landscape over time towards being more willing to make concessions to the Palestinians.  
The question we address is whether this shift was due to the terrorist tactics employed by 
various Palestinian factions. 
 
2.2  Data on Israeli Fatalities in Terror Attacks 
Information on Israeli fatalities from terror attacks is taken from B’tselem, an 
Israeli human rights organization.  B’tselem’s data (thought to be accurate, reliable, and 
comprehensive) are widely used in studies focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
(Gould and Stecklov (2008), Becker and Rubinstein (2008), Jaeger and Paserman (2008), 
Jaeger et al. (2008), and others).  The data include information on the date, location, and 
circumstances of each terror attack, which allows us to classify every Israeli fatality   14
according to the subdistrict where the incident took place.  Our measure of fatalities 
includes only civilian (non-combatant) casualties which did not occur in the West Bank 
or Gaza Strip.  There is substantial time series and geographic variation in Israeli 
fatalities, which has been used in many of the papers cited above to identify the effect of 
terror on other outcomes.   
Figure 3 depicts the total number of fatalities across subdistricts.  The figure 
shows that terror factions especially targeted the most populated subdistricts of the 
country (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa).  In addition, subdistricts like Hadera and Afula, 
which are close to particularly radical cities under the control of the Palestinian Authority 
(e.g. Jenin), suffer from a higher than average level of terror fatalities.  Table 1 presents 
the number of Israeli fatalities over time.  The most violent period occurred between 
1999 and 2003, which coincided with the outbreak of the second “Intifada.”  Overall, 
there seems to be an upward trend in terror activity over time, and this coincided with the 
shift in the political landscape towards a higher willingness to make concessions.   
However, these two trends are not necessarily causally related.  For this reason, our 
strategy is to exploit geographic variation in the trends over time, rather than looking at 
the aggregate trends.  
Figure 4 presents a first look at whether the increase in fatalities within a 
subdistrict between 1988 and 2003 (the peak period of terror) is correlated with the 
average change in political views within each subdistrict.  The line in Figure 4 is the 
fitted quadratic curve estimated from OLS using the sample of subdistricts depicted in the 
figure.  The figure displays a positive relationship between the change in fatalities in a 
subdistrict with the change in the average willingness to grant concessions within that   15
subdistrict.  However, the relationship seems to get weaker at higher levels of terror.  
This non-linear pattern is also found in Figures 5 to 7 which show the relationship 
between changes in local terror fatalities and changes in the other outcomes: support for a 
Palestinian state, support for the right-wing parties, and holding an unfavorable opinion 
of Arabs.  These patterns are all consistent with the idea that terror has induced Israelis to 
become more accommodating to Palestinian interests, but they are really just a first cut at 
the data.  The next section presents our main empirical strategy.  
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy is designed to identify the causal effect of terrorism on the 
political preferences of the Israeli population.  Our unit of observation is the individual, 
and we model his/her views as a function of his/her personal characteristics, location of 
residence, survey year, and the level of recent terror activity in the individual’s 
subdistrict.  Specifically, we estimate the following linear regression model: 
 
(Political Attitude)ijt = α(Terror Fatalities)jt + Xijt β + γt + µj + εijt                 (1) 
 
where (Political Attitude)ijt measures the personal viewpoint of individual i who lives in 
subdistrict  j  in the survey taken before parliamentary elections in year t;  (Terror 
Fatalities)jt is the number of fatalities in subdistrict j before the elections in t;  γt is a 
fixed-effect for each election year which controls for aggregate trends in political 
preferences and terror activity;  µj is a fixed-effect unique to subdistrict j;  and Xijt is a 
vector of individual and subdistrict-level characteristics.  These characteristics include   16
the individual’s gender, age (and age squared), years of schooling, schooling interacted 
with age, immigrant status, ethnicity (Asia-Africa origin versus all other groups), level of 
religious observance, level of expenditures (designed to control for income), persons per 
room in the individual’s house (another proxy for income), and total population in the 
person’s subdistrict in year t.  Unobserved determinants of the individual’s views are 
captured by the error term, εijt. 
The goal of the proposed econometric specification is to identify α, which 
represents the causal effect of local terror activity on an individual’s political attitudes.  
By including fixed-effects for each subdistrict and survey year, we are essentially 
examining whether changes over time in terror activity within a subdistrict are correlated 
with the changes over time in political views in that subdistrict, after controlling for the 
national trend and a rich set of personal characteristics.  The identifying assumption is 
that the allocation of terror attacks across subdistricts over time is not correlated with the 
local trend in political views relative to the national trend. 
There are several possible reasons why terror may affect a person’s political 
views.  A terror attack triggers residents of a subdistrict to alter their daily routine as a 
consequence of a change in their perceived personal security, possibly affecting their 
attitudes towards the peace process (Gordon and Arian (2001)).  Furthermore, the 
occurrence of a terror attack directly affects the salience of the conflict in the targeted 
subdistrict, and may affect not only the probability that its residents attach to a peaceful 
solution to the conflict, but also their willingness to grant concessions differently than in 
the other subdistricts.  In addition, there is convincing evidence that the local effect of 
violence is amplified by the coverage of the local media (Karol and Miguel (2007);   17
Sheafer and Dvir-Gvirsman (2009)).  Having said that, it is important to note that all of 
these mechanisms could theoretically produce either a softening or a hardening of one’s 
positions versus the goals of the terrorist faction.  In this sense, our strategy will estimate 
the total effect of terror on personal attitudes rather than differentiating between various 
mechanisms.  
 
4. The Effect of Terror on the Willingness to Grant Territorial Concessions  
We now analyze the effect of terror on our main outcome variable: a person’s 
willingness to make territorial concessions to the Palestinians.  The first four columns of 
Table 3 use the number of fatalities in the subdistrict within 12 months prior to the survey 
as the main treatment variable of interest, while the last four columns use the number of 
fatalities per person within the subdistrict.
14  All of the specifications evaluate the effect 
of terrorism on a person’s willingness to make territorial concessions, but we test the 
robustness of our findings by adding more control variables to the specification in 
successive columns.  For example, the first column does not include any other controls, 
the second column includes year and subdistrict fixed-effects, the third column adds basic 
personal characteristics (gender, age, age-squared, and schooling), and the last column 
includes all of the other controls listed in the previous section.  The last four columns 
repeat the exercise using fatalities per capita instead of the number of fatalities. 
The results in Table 3 suggest that there is no linear effect of the local level of 
terror activity in the last 12 months on a person’s willingness to grant concessions to the 
Palestinians.  This result is consistently found when the additional control variables are 
                                                  
14  Throughout the paper, specifications which use the number of fatalities include an additional control for 
the subdistrict’s population.  Specifications using the number of fatalities per capita already are controlling 
for population size.   18
added, and is also found with the two ways of defining terror activity at the subdistrict 
level (the number of attacks in the last 12 months or the same number per capita).  Many 
of the coefficients on the other controls are highly significant: the willingness to grant 
concessions increases with education and age (up to a point), and is also higher for 
women versus men, natives versus immigrants, secular versus religious, and individuals 
who did not immigrate from Russia and do not have an Asia-Africa ethnic background.   
However, due to the non-linear pattern exhibited in Figure 4, we now include a 
quadratic term for the terror treatment variable in order to see whether its effect is non-
linear.  Table 4 replicates all the specifications in Table 3 after including the terror 
measure squared.  The results are very different now, with the linear term and the 
quadratic term highly significant across all specifications.  The coefficients suggest that 
terrorism increases an individual’s willingness to grant concessions up to a point, and 
then further terror attacks reduce the willingness to grant concessions.  This pattern is 
robust to adding different sets of controls and with using both measures of local terror 
activity (the number of fatalities in the last 12 months or the same number per capita).
15  
Notably, the coefficients of interest in Table 4 are very similar across different 
specifications (even the one without any controls or fixed-effects for each year and 
subdistrict), which highlights the idea that terror activity can safely be considered an 
exogenous treatment, and thus, we are identifying the causal effect.  Also, it is worth 
noting that the results in Table 4 are essentially the same when we use an alternative 
definition for the individuals’ willingness to grant concessions (which codes those that 
                                                  
15 The increase in the size of the coefficient from column 2 to column 3 in Table 4 is mainly due to the 
change in the sample when we add the additional controls (some of them have missing values) rather than 
the controls themselves.  For example, the coefficients for column 2 when we restrict the sample to that 
used in column 3 are 0.0043 (0.0013) and 0.0001 (0.0000), which are very close to those obtained in 
column 3.    19
responded with a “four” to the question in 1996 and 1999 as being willing to make 
concessions rather than being unwilling to make concessions – see  Appendix Table 1), 
when we focus only on the surveys of 1996 and onwards (Appendix Table 2), and would 
even be a bit larger and more significant if we presented the marginal effects (evaluated 
at the means) from a probit regression model instead of using a linear probability 
model.
16  
The size of the coefficients in column 3 of Table 4 suggest that the total effect of 
terror fatalities is positive until 78 local casualties are reached, and then the total effect 
makes Israelis adopt a more hard-line stance.  Similarly, the marginal effect of terror on 
granting concessions is positive until 39 casualties are reached, and then additional 
casualties reduces the willingness to concede territory.  That is, a moderate amount of 
terror is effective, but then it can backfire on the terrorist group.  For each combination of 
18 subdistricts and 6 survey years, there are only two cases that reach levels high enough 
to backfire – Jerusalem had 47 fatalities in 1996 and 89 fatalities in 2003.  The amount of 
fatalities for 1996 still represents a total effect towards moderation, but the latter number 
is large enough to harden the stance of Jerusalem residents towards the Palestinians.   
Using the average number of local fatalities in the last 12 months in 2003 (which is 26), 
column 3 suggests that the outbreak of the second Intifada made the average Israeli 6.5 
percentage points more likely to be willing to grant concessions.  Therefore, these 
findings are significant not only in the statistical sense, but also in terms of the 
magnitudes of the coefficients.  
                                                  
16 The probit results are available upon request.  We choose to present results from a linear probability 
model instead of a probit estimation since the interpretation of the marginal effects using a non-linear 
specification are not straightforward in a probit model.   20
Table 5 presents a few robustness checks using alternative definitions for the local 
level of terror in each subdistrict around the time of the election.  So far, Table 4 used the 
number of fatalities in the last 12 months and this same measure divided by the 
subdistrict population.  These results are replicated in the upper left quadrant of Table 5, 
while the specifications to the right use the number of attacks instead of the number of 
fatalities in the last 12 months.  The number of attacks is defined as the number of attacks 
with at least one fatality, which essentially gives equal weight to all fatal attacks 
regardless of the number killed.  The results are very similar using this measure, in the 
sense of displaying a highly significant non-linear pattern.  The bottom panel of Table 5 
replicates the top half, but uses the level of terror activity in the subdistrict since the last 
election rather than the last 12 months.  Using this treatment variable yields the same 
non-linear pattern but the coefficients are not as significant.  The overall effect of terror 
attacks, however, remains highly statistically significant at the one percent level.   
Therefore, even if current terror activity has a bigger impact than attacks occurring more 
in the distant past, the effect of terrorism on an individual’s political preferences does not 
disappear completely even when measured over a longer time period.  
Table 6 replicates the two specifications presented in the second column of Table 
5, but presents the results separately for different subsamples of the population according 
to their gender, age, level of expenditures, education, religious observance, immigrant 
status, and ethnicity.  The results appear to be significant for all groups, with slightly 
stronger effects for women and individuals who are younger, less-educated, and with 
lower expenditures.  However, much larger effects are found for religious Israelis versus 
non-religious, immigrants versus natives, and those with an Asia-Africa ethnic   21
background.  Table 2 showed that religious individuals and those from an Asia-Africa 
background tend to be more right-wing than their counterparts (natives and immigrants 
are not much different from each other).  Therefore, Table 6 demonstrates that the effect 
of terror is larger for particular groups which typically support right-wing political 
parties.  This pattern illustrates how the political map is changing over time as the right-
wing is shifting to the left in response to terror.    
 
5. The Effect of Terror on other Political Attitudes  
We now examine whether terror has affected three other political views:  support 
for a Palestinian state, holding an unfavorable opinion of Arabs, and defining oneself as 
being right-wing.  In addition, we create a summary measure of all four political views 
(the three used in this section plus the one used in the last section -- “agree to territorial 
concessions”) by using the first factor after performing a factor analysis on all four 
measures.  The empirical specifications are identical to those described above.   
 
5.1  Support for a Palestinian State 
The first panel in Table 7 presents the results for the individual’s willingness to 
support the creation of a Palestinian state.  As seen in the previous analysis, column 1 
shows that there is no linear effect, whereas column 2 suggests that there is a non-linear 
effect of fatalities in the last 12 months on the individual’s support for a Palestinian state.  
The results indicate that support for a Palestinian state increases with fatalities, but then 
decreases after reaching a certain threshold.  Column 3 shows that this pattern tends to be 
more significant statistically when we use the level of local terror since the last election   22
rather than the last 12 months.  The last two columns show that the same conclusions 
apply when we use the number of attacks, with attacks since the previous elections 
showing a non-linear effect, while attacks in the last 12 months is the only proxy for 
terrorism that is not statistically significant.  In summary, although the results are not as 
significant as those found for “willingness to grant concessions,” the general pattern is 
similar – terror makes individuals more accommodating to Palestinian interests up to a 
point, but “too much” terror creates a more hard-line stance.   
Table 8 breaks down the results for this outcome measure within the different 
subsamples.  Once again, the general non-linear pattern of results is apparent for all of the 
different sub-groups, although not always statistically significant.  In particular, the 
effects are much larger for religious individuals (versus secular) and those with an Asia-
Africa background.  This pattern shows again that the effect is much larger for 
traditionally right-wing groups.  Table 8 also shows larger effects for older individuals, 
immigrants versus natives, and those with a higher level of education.  These groups are 
not particularly different from their counterparts in terms of their overall political 
preferences.  Therefore, these differences show that the shift in political views was 
prevalent in, but not limited to, traditionally right-wing parts of the population.  
 
5.2  Holding an Unfavorable Opinion of Arabs  
Table 7 and Table 9 present the analysis of how terror affects the individual’s 
probability of having an unfavorable opinion of Arabs.  Table 7 shows once again that the 
effect of terrorism is non-linear: somewhat surprisingly, Israelis respond to terror attacks 
by becoming more sympathetic to Arabs in general, although terror activity beyond a   23
certain threshold turns public opinion in the opposite direction.  This pattern is apparent 
across three of the four proxies for the local level of recent terror activity used in Table 7.   
Table 9 presents the analysis with this outcome variable within the various 
subgroups.  Overall, the results within all the groups are stronger when we use terror 
fatalities per capita in the last 12 months versus fatalities per capital since the last 
election, but the general non-linear pattern is seen within all the various sub-groups: men 
and women, all levels of expenditures, educated and less-educated, religious and secular, 
etc.  There is some evidence that the effects increase with education and age, but once 
again, the results appear to be much more pronounced for religious versus secular, and 
those with an Asia-Africa ethnic background.  These are the same groups that showed 
larger effects for the other two outcome variables: willingness to make concessions and 
support for a Palestinians state.  Therefore, the results for “having an unfavorable opinion 
of Arabs” in Table 9 are very likely to be related to the effects we found for the other 
outcomes.   
 
5.3  Defining Oneself as being Right-Wing  
Table 7 presents the main results for the effect of terror on the probability of 
identifying oneself as being on the right-wing side of the political scale.  Again, there is 
no linear effect, but a very strong and significant non-linear pattern is found using all four 
ways of defining the local level of recent terror activity.  The results indicate that terror 
attacks up to a certain point decrease the probability of being right-wing, but terror 
activity beyond that threshold turns Israelis towards the right side of the political 
spectrum.  Table 10 shows that these effects are found within all the different subgroups   24
in the population: males and females, all age groups, all levels of expenditures, religious 
and secular, natives and immigrants, and those with and without an Asia-Africa ethnic 
background.  The results appear to be a bit stronger for males and individuals with fewer 
expenditures, lower education, and for natives versus immigrants.  Once again, the 
familiar pattern occurs whereby much stronger effects are found for religious versus 
secular individuals and those with an Asia-Africa background.  
 
5.4  A Summary Measure of all Four Political Attitudes Based on Factor Analysis 
In addition to the results presented separately for each of the four political 
attitudes, we now present results using a summary measure of all four.  To do this, we use 
the first factor after performing a factor analysis of the four different views.  The first 
factor explains 51 percent of the variation, and the factor loadings can be interpreted as 
giving a more positive weight to more accommodating positions.  Specifically, the factor 
loadings on the first factor are: 0.81 on “agreement to territorial concessions”; 0.76 on 
“support for a Palestinian state”; -0.50 on “unfavorable opinion of Arabs”; and -0.79 on 
“defining oneself as having a right-wing political tendency.”  As such, positive values of 
the first factor indicate a more left-wing position on the conflict. 
The lower right panel of Table 7 presents the main results for this summary 
measure of all four political attitudes.  As seen before, the effect is clearly not linear, but 
there is a strong and significant non-linear effect of terrorism on this summary measure – 
terrorist attacks induce individuals to shift their views towards a more accommodating 
stance, but after a certain threshold, additional attacks cause Israelis to adopt a more hard-
line stance versus the Palestinians.   25
Table 11 presents the results for our summary measure of attitudes for different 
sub-populations.  Again, the non-linear pattern is significant for all groups based on 
gender, age, expenditures, education, native status, and ethnicity.  We also find the 
familiar pattern whereby the effects are much stronger for people who are religious 
versus secular, and for those from an Asia-Africa ethnic background.  These findings 
demonstrate that terrorism has had a pervasive impact within almost all sub-groups of the 
population, with the strongest impact on groups that are particularly known for holding 
right-wing views.  
The consistent finding of stronger effects across all outcomes for these 
traditionally right-wing groups highlights the dramatic shift in the political map in Israel.  
Moreover, the similarity of the results across all four related outcomes (and the summary 
measure of all four) for the entire population and within different groups shows that the 
significant effect, and non-linear pattern, of terrorism on public opinion is robust to 
several ways of defining one’s views towards the Palestinians.  Overall, terrorism appears 
to move public opinion towards a more accommodating stance towards some of the goals 
of terrorist factions, and even makes Israelis more favorable in their opinion of Arabs.  
However, using terror as a strategic tool can backfire if it goes beyond a certain point, in 
which case, Israelis harden their stance and move to the right in response to further 
attacks. 
 
6. Supporting the Right-Wing Bloc in the Upcoming Elections  
We now present a similar analysis for our final outcome variable: supporting the 
right-wing bloc in the upcoming elections.  As we will see, this variable is fundamentally   26
different in its nature than the previous outcome measures.  Table 12 presents the main 
analysis using four different ways of defining the local level of recent terror activity.  In 
contrast to all previous outcomes, the linear effect is significant and positive, which 
suggests that terror attacks encourage Israelis to vote for right-wing parties.  This finding 
is consistent with Berrebi and Klor (2008), who used data on actual voting patterns at the 
local level (rather than our measure which uses the respondent’s voting intentions in the 
upcoming elections) to show that local attacks turned voters towards right-wing parties.   
However, Table 12 shows some evidence that the effect is non-linear – with low 
levels of terror causing voters to turn towards left-wing parties and higher levels of terror 
causing voters to shift towards right-wing parties.  This non-linear pattern is consistent 
with our general findings based on the other outcome measures:  terror causes Israelis to 
be more sympathetic to Palestinian interests, but only up to a certain threshold level – 
beyond which they harden their stance by turning to the right.  So, overall, one could 
draw opposing conclusions from the linear versus the quadratic specification for this 
outcome variable, but the positive linear effect is a good indication that a significant 
portion of the sample was in the range of terror attacks large enough to produce a shift 
towards right-wing parties.   
Combined with our previous results, it appears that terrorism is causing Israelis to 
increasingly vote for right-wing parties (although they turn left for lower levels of terror), 
while at the same time, they are turning left in their political views.  The difference in the 
pattern of results can be reconciled by the idea that the platforms of the political parties 
are endogenously changing over time.  This change over time is evident from a casual 
inspection of the parties’ official platforms.  For example, the platform of the right-wing   27
Likud party during the 1988 elections stated on its first page that: “The State of Israel has 
the right to sovereignty in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip,” and that “there will be no 
territorial division, no Palestinian state, foreign sovereignty, or foreign self-determination 
(in the land of Israel).”  This stands in stark contrast to the Likud’s platform before the 
2009 elections, which stated that: “The Likud is prepared to make (territorial) 
concessions in exchange for a true and reliable peace agreement.”  In fact, the Likud 
party in 2009 is arguably to the left of the left-wing Labor party’s platform in 1988.
 17 
Given that the effect on party preferences in Table 12 appears to be linear, Table 
13 presents the analysis within each subgroup using a linear specification.  Table 13 
shows that the linear effect of terrorism on supporting right-wing parties is found for 
individuals who tend to be: male, poor, non-native, less educated, secular, and not from 
an Asia-Africa ethnic background. The latter two groups are quite notable, since our 
previous results indicate that terrorism leads to a more accommodating attitude 
particularly among religious individuals and those from an Asia-Africa background.  In 
contrast, we now find that the shift towards right-wing parties occurred within subgroups 
which are strongly identified with left-wing parties, rather than those groups who are 
typically right-wing.   
Therefore, the stronger results for left-leaning groups on the probability to vote 
right-wing, combined with our evidence that they are not shifting towards less 
accommodating political views regarding Palestinian demands, shows that these groups 
are increasing their support for right-wing parties only because the right-wing parties are 
moving to the left.  As a result, the overall pattern of results suggests that terror is shifting 
                                                  
17 For the 1988 elections, the Labor-Alignment party platform “ruled out the establishment of another 
separate state within the territorial area between Israel and Jordan.”  For the 2009 elections, however, Labor 
supported the creation of a Palestinian state together with the evacuation of isolated settlements.    28
the entire political landscape by moving public opinion to the left, and moving the right-
wing parties accordingly.
18  This pattern highlights the idea that looking only at how 
terror affects voting patterns can be misleading, since parties are endogenously changing 
their platforms in response to terrorism and its effect on public sentiments. 
 
7. Testing for Reverse Causality and Changes on the Population’s Characteristics 
There are two main concerns regarding our empirical strategy to identify the 
causal effect of terrorism on the political preferences of the population.  The first is 
related to reverse causality, whereby political views in certain geographic areas may 
induce terror attacks specifically targeted against them.  The second concern is that our 
findings may be an indication that terror attacks are inducing a change in the composition 
of the local population, rather than affecting the local population’s preferences.  That is, it 
is possible, although seemingly improbable, that our results are due to terror attacks in a 
given location inducing individuals who tend to be right-wing in their views but vote left-
wing to migrate to subdistricts which suffer less from terrorism.  This scenario could 
produce spurious positive correlations between local terror activity, the tendency to be 
more accommodating to Palestinian goals, and the probability of voting for right-wing 
parties.  This section addresses these two concerns in turn.  
In order to address the issue of reverse causality, we use the following model to 
examine whether the political views of individuals within a locality are correlated with 
local levels of terror in the next election cycle:  
                                                  
18 The political parties’ reaction to terrorism is consistent with theoretical analyses of political competition 
when one candidate has a valence advantage (Groseclose (2001) and Aragones and Palfrey (2002)).  Given 
that terrorism increases the “valence” of parties in the right bloc (Berrebi and Klor, 2006), the move 
leftwards of left wing parties and the adoption of a more moderate position by right wing parties match 
those theoretical predictions.    29
 
(Terrorism)jt = ρ (Political Attitudes)jt + Xjt θ + γt + µj + νjt                 (2) 
 
where (Terrorism)jt measures the level of terror attacks or fatalities in subdistrict j 
between parliamentary elections in years t and t+1; (Political Attitudes)jt is the average 
viewpoint of residents of subdistrict j in the survey taken before parliamentary elections 
in year t;  γt is a fixed-effect for each election year;  µj is a fixed-effect unique to 
subdistrict j;  and Xjt is a vector of demographic characteristics in subdistrict j before the 
elections in year t.  
The estimation of equation (2) appears in Table 14, where the odd numbered 
columns use a specification which includes only year and subdistrict fixed-effects, while 
the even numbered columns add a rich set of characteristics measured at the subdistrict 
level.  Table 14 shows no significant correlation between the local population’s attitudes 
and the occurrence of future terror attacks.  Moreover, there is not even a consistent 
pattern in the signs of the coefficients across the different proxies of terrorism.  These 
results are consistent with the institutional design of the Israeli electoral system.  In this 
system, which is characterized by nationwide proportional representation, every vote has 
the same electoral power regardless of the individual’s location.  Therefore, terror 
factions have no electoral incentive to strategically choose the location of the attack 
based on the preferences of the local population.  
In order to address whether individuals react to terrorism by moving to other 
subdistricts, we now examine whether the local level of terror induces a change in the 
observable characteristics of the local population.  To do this, we regress the personal   30
characteristics of each individual on the local level of recent terror activity, while 
controlling for the fixed-effects of each subdistrict and year.  The inclusion of locality 
and year fixed-effects allows us to test whether changes in the characteristics of the local 
population over time vary systematically with the local level of recent terror activity.  
Table 15 performs this analysis by examining the how local terror is related to the 
following characteristics of the local population: gender, education, religiosity, native 
status, ethnicity (Asia-Africa background), age, and expenditures.  In addition, Table 15 
examines whether local terror is related to the size of the local population, which sheds 
light on whether terror induces an overall out-migration from areas with high levels of 
terrorism. 
The results in Table 15 show that terror is not correlated with population size, 
which suggests that terror does not induce Israelis to migrate to calmer areas.  In addition, 
terrorism is not correlated with changes in the demographic composition of the 
subdistricts, which should not be surprising, given that the effect of terror on a person's 
willingness to grant concessions is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of a rich set of 
observable characteristics and subdistrict fixed-effects (Table 4).  In particular, recent 
levels of terrorism are not correlated with being religious or coming from an Asia-Africa 
background – these are the two groups which are clearly more right-wing in their views 
and they are also the two demographic groups which displayed the strongest effects in 
our analysis.  The fact that terror is not correlated with changes in the characteristics 
which are strong predictors of being right-wing in their views suggests that right-wing 
individuals are not moving away from areas with high levels of terror.  Although it is 
possible that terror induces individuals with unobservable right-wing preferences to leave   31
areas with high terror activity, it is reassuring that there is no evidence that this is 
occurring with regards to observable measures which are strong predictors of right-wing 
views. 
The one pattern that does emerge in Table 15 is that terrorist factions strategically 
target localities that are becoming more affluent, as suggested by Benmelech and Berrebi 
(2007).  This finding could be interpreted as evidence in favor of the idea that terror 
induces right-wing migration, since affluent Israelis do tend to be more left-wing in their 
views (Table 2).  However, this relationship is entirely due to the prevalence of terror 
attacks in Jerusalem.  When the observations from Jerusalem are not included in the 
analysis in Table 15, the correlation becomes completely insignificant.  However, 
dropping Jerusalem from our main analysis does not affect our estimates of the effect of 
terror on political views.  For example, the coefficients in the last column in Table 4 
become 4.31 (1.36) and -35.49 (13.49), which are very close to the magnitude and 
significance of the coefficients in Table 4.   
Overall, we do not find any evidence that endogenous moving is responsible for 
our results.  In particular, terror does not induce a change in the size of the local 
population, nor does it seem to induce a flight of right-wing individuals who tend to vote 
left-wing (which is the unlikely scenario necessary to explain the pattern of our results).  
Therefore, although we lack data on detailed migration patterns which would be useful to 
address the issue of endogenous moving, the evidence in Table 15 is very reassuring.  If 
terrorism is not correlated with observable variables that are correlated with right-wing   32





This paper presents the first systematic examination of whether terrorism is an 
effective strategy to achieve political goals, while paying attention to the issue of 
causality.  Our results show that terror attacks by Palestinian factions have succeeded to 
move the entire political landscape of the Israeli electorate towards a more 
accommodating stance regarding the political objectives of the Palestinians.  Specifically, 
we show that local terror attacks cause Israelis to be: (i) more willing to grant territorial 
concessions to the Palestinians; (ii) more willing to accept a Palestinian state; (iii) less 
likely to identify oneself as being right-wing; and (iv) more likely to have a favorable 
opinion of Arabs.  Although terrorism induces Israelis to vote increasingly for right-wing 
parties, our results indicate that right-wing parties (and particular demographic groups 
which tend to be right-wing in their views) are shifting to the left in response to terror.  
These findings highlight the importance of examining how terrorism affects political 
views, not just voting patterns, when assessing the effectiveness of terror.  Looking at the 
effect of terrorism only on voting patterns in order to infer its effect on political views 
would lead to the opposite conclusion, at least in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. 
While terrorism in small doses appears to be an effective political tool, our results 
suggest that terror activity beyond a certain threshold seems to backfire on the goals of 
                                                  
19 The analysis in Berrebi and Klor (2008) based on 240 municipalities and local councils is consistent with 
this conclusion.  They showed that terrorism did not affect net migration across localities or political 
participation of the electorate during the period at issue.   33
terrorist factions, by hardening the stance of targeted population.  This finding could be 
one explanation for why terrorist factions tend to implement their tactics in episodes that 
are rather limited in scale and diverse in terms of geographic placement.  
Others researchers and commentators have argued that Palestinian terrorism has 
worked in exacting political concessions (Dershowitz (2002) and Hoffman (2006)).  They 
claim, however, that terrorism worked because it raised the salience of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and brought pressure from the international community on the Israeli 
government.  Our paper shows that terrorism works not only because of the possibility of 
fostering international pressure, but also because it creates domestic political pressure 
from the targeted electorate.  An effective and comprehensive counterterrorism policy has 
to take this into account, in addition to developing policies to deter terror attacks from 
occurring.   
Many conflicts in history have been settled by peaceful means (the racial conflict 
in South Africa, the civil rights movement in the US, the British occupation of India, etc).  
Understanding when conflicts are conducted peacefully versus violently is a complicated 
issue that deserves more attention.  By showing that terror can be an effective political 
tool, our findings not only provide insights into how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has 
evolved over time, but also shed light on why terror appears to be increasing in many 
parts of the world.    34
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Figure 3: Distribution of Terror Fatalities Across Sub-districts 
 
Notes: Total number of terror fatalities across sub-districts between July 23
rd, 1984 (date of 
1984 parliamentary elections) and March 28
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 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003 2006
Agree to Territorial Concessions to the Palestinians 0.383 0.485 0.426 0.499 0.545 0.557
(0.486) (0.500) (0.495) (0.500) (0.498) (0.497)
0.260 0.290 0.482 0.554 0.486 0.668
(0.439) (0.454) (0.500) (0.497) (0.500) (0.471)
Right-wing Political Tendency 0.504 0.427 0.393 0.389 0.517 0.413
(0.500) (0.495) (0.489) (0.488) (0.500) (0.493)
Unfavorable Opinion of Arabs 0.293 0.125 0.475 0.386 0.611 -
(0.455) (0.331) (0.500) (0.487) (0.488)
Vote for Right Bloc of Political Parties 0.529 0.443 0.438 0.380 0.463 0.328
(0.499) (0.497) (0.496) (0.486) (0.499) (0.469)
Number of Observations 873 1192 1168 1060 1058 1505
Number of Terror Fatalities since Previous Elections 25 78 141 44 408 198
Number of Terror Fatalities within a Year of Elections 6 11 71 2 275 19
Notes: Entries in the table represent the average of the respective variable for each survey. Standard deviations appear in parenthesis. The number of observations refer to the total number of Jewish individuals
that reside within the green line interviewed in each survey. The exact number of observations for each variable varies slightly because not all respondents answered each question. Source: Israeli National
Elections Study (INES). The last two rows report the number of fatalities from terror attacks. Source: B'tselem.
Agree to the Establishment of a Palestinian State in 
the Territories as part of a Peace Settlement
Table 1
Attitudes Towards the Conflict, Suport for Different Political Parties and Terror Fatalities by YearTerritorial 
Concessions
Palestinian State
All 0.489 0.473 0.440 0.377 0.421 1.00
Gender
Males 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.37 0.41 0.51
Females 0.51 0.47 0.46 0.39 0.43 0.49
Age
15-29 0.43 0.41 0.48 0.37 0.47 0.32
30-45 0.51 0.46 0.45 0.37 0.43 0.30
46 and older 0.55 0.54 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.37
Years of Schooling
Elementary and Secondary 0.44 0.40 0.49 0.41 0.48 0.57
Higher Education 0.58 0.58 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.43
Religiosity
Secular 0.54 0.52 0.39 0.34 0.35 0.67
Observant 0.40 0.37 0.54 0.45 0.56 0.33
Place of Birth
Immigrants 0.48 0.49 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.39
Native Israelis 0.51 0.46 0.45 0.36 0.42 0.61
Ethnic Background
African-Asian Ethnicity 0.41 0.37 0.54 0.38 0.53 0.37
Non African-Asian Ethnicity 0.54 0.53 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.63
Household Expenditures
Less than Average 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.46 0.39
About Average 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.36 0.43 0.34
More than Average 0.57 0.54 0.39 0.33 0.36 0.27
Note: Entries in the table show the means over the entire sample period. Source:  Authors' calculations using survey data from INES.
Share of Sample 
Population
Table 2
Political Attitudes by Demographic Characteristics
Vote for Right Bloc 
of Political Parties





0.000085 0.000001 0.00008 -0.00016 0.5144 0.3390 0.4710 0.2900
Age 0.0079 *** 0.0145 *** 0.0079 *** 0.0143 ***
Age Square -0.0001 ** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 ** -0.0001 ***
Male -0.0279 ** -0.0134 -0.0290 ** -0.0130
Years of Schooling 0.0207 *** 0.0312 *** 0.0208 *** 0.0309 ***
Years of Schooling * Age -0.0003 *** -0.0003 ***
Immigrant -0.0305 -0.0292
African-Asian Ethnicity -0.0693 *** -0.0690 ***
From former Soviet Bloc -0.1180 *** -0.1210 ***
House Density (persons / rooms) -0.1060 *** -0.1070 ***
Expenditures (base category - much more than average):
- a little more than average 0.0157 0.0164
- about average -0.0231 -0.0219
- a little less than average -0.0519 ** -0.0496 **
- much less than average -0.1060 *** -0.1040 ***
Religiosity (base category -  observe all):
-observe a lot 0.0210 0.0195
- a little observance 0.1060 *** 0.1020 ***
- secular 0.2150 *** 0.2110 ***







The Effect of Terror Fatalities on Support for Granting Territorial Concessions
Note: Estimated using OLS. Dependent variable is indicator for agreeing to territorial concessions to Palestinians. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict-year level, in






















































































Linear Effect 0.0054 * 0.0032 ** 0.0037 *** 0.0046 *** 4.285 * 3.526 *** 3.847 *** 4.563 ***
Quadratic Effect -0.00008 *** -0.00004 *** -0.00005 *** -0.00006 *** -43.46 ** -34.18 *** -36.15 *** -45.89 ***
Age 0.0079 *** 0.0145 *** 0.0080 *** 0.0145 ***
Age Square -0.0001 ** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 ** -0.0001 ***
Male -0.0295 *** -0.0147 -0.0310 *** -0.0147
Years of Schooling 0.0207 *** 0.0312 *** 0.0208 *** 0.0312 ***
Years of Schooling * Age -0.0003 *** -0.0003 ***
Immigrant -0.0293 -0.0286
African-Asian Ethnicity -0.0701 *** -0.0690 ***
From former Soviet Bloc -0.1190 *** -0.1210 ***
House Density (persons / rooms) -0.1040 *** -0.1060 ***
Expenditures (base category - much more than average):
- a little more than average 0.0156 0.0154
- about average -0.0230 -0.0233
- a little less than average -0.0513 ** -0.0520 **
- much less than average -0.1050 *** -0.1060 ***
Religiosity (base category -  observe all):
-observe a lot 0.0235 0.0220
- a little observance 0.1130 *** 0.1090 ***
- secular 0.2250 *** 0.2190 ***






Number of Fatalities Fatalities per Capita
Table 4
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on Support for Granting Territorial Concessions
Note: Estimated using OLS. Dependent variable is indicator for agreeing to territorial concessions to Palestinians. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict-year level, in
brackets. P-Value on effect of terrorism tests the hypothesis that the joint effect of all proxies for severity of terrorism included in each regression are equal to zero. * indicates statistically

























Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No






























(2) (3) (4) (6)
[0.0000] [0.0000] [11.26]
0.0004 P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
Number of Observations
0.0099 0.0013 0.0001 0.0219 0.0063
0.130 0.045Variable
Attacks within one year of the survey
- Linear Effect 0.00457 *** 4.5630 *** 0.0307 *** 17.743 ***
- Quadratic Effect -0.00006 *** -45.886 *** -0.0021 *** -855.7 **
Attacks since previous elections up to the survey
- Linear Effect 0.0015 1.1310 0.0067 9.4038 ***





P-Value on Effect of Terrorism 0.0001
Note: All regressions estimated using OLS. Dependent variable is indicator for agreeing to territorial concessions to Palestinians. In
addition to the respective proxy for the severity of terrorism, all regressions include the same covariates as specifications 4 and 8 in Table 4.
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict-year level, in brackets. P-Value on effect of terrorism tests the hypothesis
that the joint effect of all proxies for severity of terrorism included in each regression are equal to zero. * indicates statistically significant at














(1) (2) (4) (5)
Table 5
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on Support for Granting Territorial Concessions
[0.0001] [76.84]
[0.00001] [11.25] [0.0004]
Timing of Terrorism 
[0.0012] [1.152] [0.0076] [5.864]- Linear Effect 5.4601 *** 3.6295 *** 5.4801 *** 4.0604 *** 3.1033 * 4.5244 ** 4.3071 *** 4.0144 ***
- Quadratic Effect -46.450 *** -44.154 *** -53.464 *** -33.270 *** -36.895 ** -50.453 *** -38.412 *** -47.076 ***
0.0008 0.0108 0.0074 0.0303 0.0481 0.0515 0.0124 0.0058
- Linear Effect 0.3856 1.7380 ** 1.2990 1.9705 ** 0.0467 0.0505 1.2126 2.3581 ***
- Quadratic Effect 0.9874 -14.604 *** -5.9294 -9.5393 * -4.1526 -3.2027 -4.1933 -18.648 ***
0.4647 0.0471 0.3364 0.0967 0.5485 0.8244 0.1716 0.0106
- Linear Effect 4.7605 *** 4.2627 ** 2.7709 ** 5.2346 *** 6.2661 *** 3.5480 *** 8.0227 *** 2.7742 ***
- Quadratic Effect -40.752 *** -52.355 *** -31.929 *** -40.970 *** -65.214 *** -36.243 *** -79.464 *** -31.667 ***
0.0060 0.0175 0.0520 0.0011 0.0087 0.0100 0.0001 0.0222
- Linear Effect 0.9457 1.8389 * -0.0276 2.7665 *** 1.1746 1.3602 * 3.5267 *** 0.1861
- Quadratic Effect -3.9635 -14.885 * -1.1555 -11.349 ** -10.685 -7.9479 -22.823 *** -2.4005


















Note: Each column in each panel presents the results of a separate OLS regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for agreeing to territorial concessions to Palestinians. In addition to the respective
proxy for the severity of terrorism, all regressions include the same covariates as specifications 4 and 8 in Table 4. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict-year level, in brackets. P-Value
on effect of terrorism tests the hypothesis that the joint effect of all proxies for severity of terrorism included in each regression are equal to zero. * indicates statistically significant at 10% level, ** indicates































P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
[5.94]
Partition by Education













Partition by Gender Partition by Age
1,815 2,118












The Effect of Terror Fatalities on Support for Granting Territorial Concessions to Palestinians, by Subpopulations











Immigrant SecularLinear Effect -0.6313 1.7895 -1.212 -5.047 ***
Quadratic Effect -26.008 ** 41.190 ***
Linear Effect 1.5670 ** -2.321 *
Quadratic Effect -12.080 ** 9.1880
Linear Effect -2.1590 -2.0140
Quadratic Effect -116.70 -30.060
Linear Effect 7.5370 * -8.1350 *
Quadratic Effect -233.10 ** 255.80 **
Linear Effect -0.1010 -5.0340 *** 0.6083 11.358 ***
Quadratic Effect 52.750 *** -115.47 ***
Linear Effect -3.0220 *** 7.3030 ***
Quadratic Effect 18.460 *** -41.355 ***
Linear Effect -17.580 *** 28.245 **
Quadratic Effect 972.00 *** -1570.78
Linear Effect -14.780 *** 31.537 ***
Quadratic Effect 394.20 *** -902.04 ***
(5)
Terror Fatalities per Capita 12 months before the survey







Terror Fatalities per Capita since previous elections
[0.778]
[5.672]










Terror Attacks per Capita 12 months before the survey
[1.664]
Unfavorable Opinion of Arabs







Note: Each column in each panel presents the results of a separate OLS regression. The dependent variable appears at the top of each panel. In addition to the respective proxies for the severity of terrorism specified on
the left column, all regressions include the same covariates as specifications 4 and 8 in Table 4. The summary measure of all four attitudes is the first factor after performing factor analysis on all four measures (the three
in this table plus "agreeing to territorial concessions"). Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict-year level, in brackets. P-Value on effect of terrorism tests the hypothesis that the joint effect of all
proxies for severity of terrorism included in each regression are equal to zero. * indicates statistically significant at 10% level, ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1%
level. 























Terror Attacks per Capita 12 months before the survey
[388.3]
Table 7
The Effect of Terrorism on Other Political Attitudes
0.0695 0.1034 0.5999 0.1120 0.0126 0.0600
4,510
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
[234.0]
[4.576]
Terror Attacks per Capita since previous elections
0.0966
4,981 4,981 4,981
[0.788]- Linear Effect 3.4736 * 0.2991 0.7600 1.7713 1.1046 1.6606 3.2496 * 0.3495
- Quadratic Effect -36.668 ** -17.036 -13.289 -12.213 -28.402 * -30.462 ** -34.699 ** -18.060
0.0731 0.1530 0.6281 0.5185 0.0088 0.0162 0.1195 0.0654
- Linear Effect 1.2356 1.8420 ** 0.1006 1.1481 1.8510 ** 1.1388 2.5791 *** 1.4946
- Quadratic Effect -7.4729 -16.347 *** 0.5022 -4.5383 -18.678 *** -10.386 -16.287 ** -15.603 ***
0.4971 0.0165 0.9642 0.3924 0.0044 0.3359 0.0259 0.0050
- Linear Effect 0.4230 3.4089 -0.8168 2.9603 ** 1.5665 1.5732 4.4185 *** 0.4731
- Quadratic Effect -6.4627 -49.570 ** -2.2686 -27.588 * -25.870 * -24.397 * -54.685 *** -14.690
0.8384 0.0271 0.4892 0.1371 0.0832 0.1559 0.0032 0.3493
- Linear Effect 0.4622 3.4611 *** 0.1457 2.3378 ** 2.2174 *** 0.9673 2.1203 * 1.4858
- Quadratic Effect -4.2233 -25.437 *** -3.3634 -12.323 * -17.615 *** -8.5408 -19.555 *** -10.789
0.7106 0.0221 0.7379 0.0864 0.0189 0.4043 0.0338 0.2735
Males Below 30 30 to 45
Table 8
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on Support for the Creation of a Palestinian State,  by Subpopulations




















Terror Fatalities per Capita Since Previous Elections
[1.04] [0.88] [1.30] [1.04]
[7.11] [6.13] [7.25]
















Terror Fatalities per Capita Within a Year of the Survey    
[1.36] [2.37] [1.84] [1.81]
[17.46] [13.04]
3,635
Note: Each column in each panel presents the results of a separate OLS regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for agreeing to the creation of a Palestinian State. In addition to the respective
proxy for the severity of terrorism, all regressions include the same covariates as specifications 4 and 8 in Table 4. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict-year level, in brackets. P-Value
on effect of terrorism tests the hypothesis that the joint effect of all proxies for severity of terrorism included in each regression are equal to zero. * indicates statistically significant at 10% level, ** indicates
statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. 
Number of Observations 3,366 2,474 3,908
[12.64]
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
[6.11]
[1.89]
[21.75] [18.95] [14.62] [15.44]
[9.17] [7.51] [7.30]
3,560 1,932 2,280 2,205
[7.82]
Terror Fatalities per Capita Since Previous Elections
[0.94] [1.27] [1.03] [1.11] [0.91]
[6.31] [5.74]- Linear Effect -5.2409 *** -4.9287 ** -4.5744 *** -2.9052 -5.5495 *** -4.9821 ** -4.8429 *** -3.3827 *
- Quadratic Effect 29.854 ** 53.980 ** 33.907 ** 17.802 50.884 *** 43.151 * 31.886 36.825 *
0.0041 0.0852 0.0368 0.1475 0.0327 0.1215 0.0402 0.1710
- Linear Effect -1.4687 -2.9994 ** -1.3461 -1.3954 -2.8328 ** -1.9029 -1.8649 -1.7292
- Quadratic Effect -0.8270 18.392 * 1.4392 3.5669 13.947 7.8106 1.7985 12.962
0.0223 0.1374 0.1362 0.2719 0.1099 0.4149 0.0365 0.2220
- Linear Effect -3.7107 ** -6.5364 *** -3.1665 -6.3144 *** -5.1364 ** -4.8697 *** -6.3699 *** -3.4958 *
- Quadratic Effect 29.1048 * 63.419 *** 22.1530 54.147 *** 38.731 43.608 *** 55.972 *** 28.961 *
0.1415  0.0027 0.2774 0.0001 0.0898 0.0050 0.0115 0.1545
- Linear Effect -1.3250 -3.5748 *** -0.9701 -3.1072 *** -2.0367 -2.3760 ** -3.4466 ** -1.3375
- Quadratic Effect 4.4123 18.832 ** 2.6462 15.174 ** 5.5653 11.983 * 18.296 * 4.2537
0.4328 0.0163 0.6029 0.0195 0.1325 0.1462 0.0530 0.3652
2,635
[10.66] [7.27]
Note: Each column in each panel presents the results of a separate OLS regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for having an unfavorable opinion of Arabs. In addition to the respective proxy
for the severity of terrorism, all regressions include the same covariates as specifications 4 and 8 in Table 4. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict-year level, in brackets. P-Value on
effect of terrorism tests the hypothesis that the joint effect of all proxies for severity of terrorism included in each regression are equal to zero. * indicates statistically significant at 10% level, ** indicates
statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. 
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism




[8.31] [9.51] [9.75] [7.19] [12.15] [6.67]
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
Terror Fatalities per Capita Since Previous Elections
[1.36] [1.33] [1.64] [1.14]
[1.79]
[16.89] [19.28] [21.37] [12.96] [28.03] [13.00] [23.40] [15.70]
Terror Fatalities per Capita Within a Year of the Survey    
[1.85] [1.82] [2.27] [1.51] [2.15] [1.39] [2.61]
African-
Asian






Partition by Country of Birth Partition by Ethnicity
1,437 1,556 1,678 1,276
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
Number of Observations 2,206 2,304
Partition by Education Partition by Religiosity
[9.59] [10.04] [10.94] [8.28]
[1.41] [1.59]
[8.06] [10.77] [9.38] [7.99]
1,582 1,491
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
Terror Fatalities per Capita Since Previous Elections
[14.54] [24.26] [15.40] [19.21]
[1.33] [1.51] [1.33] [1.37]
[20.21] [19.52] [20.20] [22.33]
[1.52] [1.40]
Terror Fatalities per Capita Within a Year of the Survey    






Above 45 Females Males Below 30 30 to 45
Table 9
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on Holding an Unfavorable Opinion of Arabs,  by Subpopulations
Partition by Gender Partition by Age Partition by Expenditures- Linear Effect -4.8855 *** -5.8210 *** -5.8188 *** -4.6897 *** -2.7800 * -6.0016 ** -5.5647 *** -3.5704 ***
- Quadratic Effect 44.392 *** 68.888 *** 56.523 *** 36.950 ** 42.789 *** 65.210 *** 54.350 *** 45.174 ***
0.0224 0.0000 0.0125 0.0156 0.0058 0.0371 0.0014 0.0097
- Linear Effect -2.3212 ** -3.8511 *** -4.9290 *** -1.5078 -1.8952 * -2.4798 * -3.8066 *** -3.5028 ***
- Quadratic Effect 9.5185 28.811 *** 24.335 *** 5.8330 17.806 *** 15.495 20.919 *** 24.886 ***
0.0321 0.0000 0.0000 0.2091 0.0464 0.1981 0.0001 0.0002
- Linear Effect -6.0731 *** -3.1717 -2.7336 * -6.7098 *** -3.8751 * -5.4329 *** -7.1836 *** -3.1131 **
- Quadratic Effect 60.051 *** 42.561 * 34.257 *** 56.731 *** 46.879 ** 55.741 *** 75.195 *** 34.295 ***
0.0000 0.1371 0.0138 0.0002 0.1172 0.0000 0.0001 0.0374
- Linear Effect -3.7198 *** -2.0204 -2.0379 *** -3.3390 *** -0.7491 -4.4609 *** -6.0628 *** -1.3525 *
- Quadratic Effect 21.858 *** 15.406 12.512 ** 17.216 *** 9.8483 25.137 *** 36.388 *** 8.8858
0.0000 0.2643 0.0537 0.0133 0.4889 0.0000 0.0000 0.2440
Males Below 30 30 to 45
Table 10
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on Right-Wing Political Tendency,  by Subpopulations




















Terror Fatalities per Capita Since Previous Elections
[1.13] [0.68] [1.01] [1.05]
[7.28] [7.30] [10.36]
















Terror Fatalities per Capita Within a Year of the Survey    
[1.14] [2.32] [1.63] [1.46]
[16.99] [11.60]
2,976
Note: Each column in each panel presents the results of a separate OLS regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for having a Right-wing Political Tendency. In addition to the respective proxy
for the severity of terrorism, all regressions include the same covariates as specifications 4 and 8 in Table 4. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict-year level, in brackets. P-Value on
effect of terrorism tests the hypothesis that the joint effect of all proxies for severity of terrorism included in each regression are equal to zero. * indicates statistically significant at 10% level, ** indicates
statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. 
Number of Observations 3,027 1,954 3,256
[10.47]
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
[10.19]
[1.74]
[22.97] [14.13] [14.53] [22.47]
[9.64] [6.03] [6.95]
3,066 1,725 1,915 2,005
[6.70]
Terror Fatalities per Capita Since Previous Elections
[0.59] [1.26] [0.83] [1.15] [1.32]
[4.49] [3.89]- Linear Effect 12.177 *** 11.404 *** 9.9927 *** 11.007 *** 7.3997 11.377 *** 12.186 *** 8.4254 ***
- Quadratic Effect -99.041 *** -140.46 *** -97.662 *** -86.175 *** -92.750 ** -122.92 *** -114.31 *** -111.65 ***
0.0018 0.0005 0.0168 0.0041 0.0835 0.0308 0.0015 0.0043
- Linear Effect 5.0747 * 9.3438 *** 5.8220 ** 5.0960 ** 5.9274 ** 5.7915 * 7.4212 *** 9.0296 ***
- Quadratic Effect -18.297 -63.224 *** -24.972 -19.430 -43.793 *** -34.095 -35.815 * -63.114 ***
0.0595 0.0008 0.0136 0.0642 0.0622 0.1962 0.0071 0.0001
- Linear Effect 9.2786 *** 11.935 ** 4.3398 15.242 *** 10.229 ** 11.176 *** 18.833 *** 5.8715 **
- Quadratic Effect -79.582 *** -155.62 *** -54.769 -124.17 *** -108.33 ** -118.66 *** -197.90 *** -66.377 ***
0.0019 0.0102 0.3166 0.0001 0.0850 0.0001 0.0001 0.0720
- Linear Effect 4.5462 ** 10.036 *** 4.8669 * 7.7727 *** 6.0551 * 7.4885 *** 12.245 *** 4.0393 *
- Quadratic Effect -22.366 * -66.689 *** -29.201 -35.740 *** -37.532 -44.070 *** -76.322 *** -23.536
0.0867 0.0318 0.2577 0.0014 0.1667 0.0074 0.0010 0.1873
2,538
[21.6] [14.7]
Note: Each column in each panel presents the results of a separate OLS regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for accomodating views toward the Palestinians using factor analysis based on
four attitudes discussed in the text. In addition to the respective proxy for the severity of terrorism, all regressions include the same covariates as specifications 4 and 8 in Table 4. Robust standard errors,
adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict-year level, in brackets. P-Value on effect of terrorism tests the hypothesis that the joint effect of all proxies for severity of terrorism included in each regression are
equal to zero. * indicates statistically significant at 10% level,  ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. 
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism




[13.0] [25.6] [18.7] [14.8] [23.7] [14.9]
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
Terror Fatalities per Capita Since Previous Elections
[2.10] [3.76] [2.93] [2.29]
[2.95]
[24.1] [52.6] [36.6] [23.7] [52.4] [25.1] [37.5] [28.4]
Terror Fatalities per Capita Within a Year of the Survey   
[2.51] [5.26] [3.69] [2.67] [3.61] [2.59] [4.52]
African-
Asian






Partition by Country of Birth Partition by Ethnicity
1,369 1,497 1,610 1,230
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
Number of Observations 2,128 2,209
Partition by Education Partition by Religiosity
[18.3] [23.1] [19.6] [14.2]
[3.00] [3.23]
[20.6] [16.1] [20.6] [15.2]
1,534 1,434
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
Terror Fatalities per Capita Since Previous Elections
[33.5] [34.5] [34.1] [31.0]
[2.87] [2.44] [2.54] [2.53]
[35.0] [34.5] [43.4] [45.5]
[2.53] [2.48]
Terror Fatalities per Capita Within a Year of the Survey    






Above 45 Females Males Below 30 30 to 45
Table 11
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on a Summary Measure of all Four Attitudes towards Palestinians Based on Factor Analysis,  by Subpopulations
Partition by Gender Partition by Age Partition by ExpendituresVariable
- Linear Effect 0.00190 *** -0.00014 1.0681 ** -0.9441
- Quadratic Effect 0.00003 * 21.56 **
- Linear Effect 0.00121 *** -0.00038 0.3972 -1.052 *
- Quadratic Effect 0.00002 *** 10.802 ***
Table 12
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on Votes for a Party in the Right Bloc of Political Parties
Number of Fatalities Fatalities per Capita
(1) (2) (4) (5)
[0.00002] [10.7]
[0.0000]




[0.0006] [0.0014] [0.5336] [1.009]
Note: All regressions estimated using OLS. Dependent variable is indicator for voting for a party in the Right Bloc of political parties. In
addition to the respective proxy for the severity of terrorism, all regressions include the same covariates as specifications 4 and 8 in Table 4.
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict-year level, in brackets. P-Value on effect of terrorism tests the hypothesis
that the joint effect of all proxies for severity of terrorism included in each regression are equal to zero. * indicates statistically significant at
10% level,  ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. 
Number of Observations 5,920 5,920 5,920
0.0004 0.0529
5,920
Attacks within one year of the survey
Attacks since previous elections up to the survey
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
[0.557]
[4.494]
P-Value on Effect of Terrorism 0.0005- Linear Effect 0.0333 2.1757 *** 1.5683 * -0.2841 1.5797 *** 2.2698 *** -0.1923 1.5916 **
- Linear Effect -0.2744 1.0487 *** 0.3345 -0.1824 0.7384 ** 1.0866 ** -0.1185 0.4075
- Linear Effect 1.0471 ** 1.2668 1.2115 ** -0.3401 1.6972 *** 0.7774 0.7770 1.3348 ***
- Linear Effect 0.6850 ** 0.1551 0.6753 *** -0.5140 1.1661 *** -0.1463 0.0086 0.6048 **
Table 13
The Linear Effect of Terror Fatalities on Votes for a Party in the Right Bloc of Political Parties,  by Subpopulations







Females Males Below 30 30 to 45
Terror Fatalities per Capita Within a Year of the Survey   
[0.77] [0.56] [0.85] [0.63] [0.65] [0.86] [0.63] [0.78]
[0.41]
Terror Fatalities per Capita Since Previous Elections
[0.42] [0.36] [0.56] [0.39] [0.37]
Number of Observations 2,900 3,020 1,918
[0.51] [0.39]
1,724
Partition by Education Partition by Religiosity Partition by Country of Birth Partition by Ethnicity













Terror Fatalities per Capita Within a Year of the Survey   
[0.49] [0.85] [0.60] [0.49] [0.66]
[0.39] [0.57] [0.27]
Terror Fatalities per Capita Since Previous Elections
[0.33] [0.38] [0.27] [0.41] [0.35]
3,600 2,234 3,686
Note: Each column in each panel presents the results of a separate OLS regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for Voting for a Political Party in the Right Bloc of Political Parties. In
addition to the respective proxy for the severity of terrorism, all regressions include the same covariates as specifications 4 and 8 in Table 4. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict-
year level, in brackets. * indicates statistically significant at 10% level,  ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. 
Number of Observations 3,405 2,515 3,971 1,949 2,3202.7062 -13.189 0.0227 -0.0093 0.0950 -4.3133 0.0019 0.0072
R
2
13.174 1.6691 0.0405 0.0228 2.5090 0.0613 0.0066 0.0029
R
2
25.464 27.049 0.0378 0.0133 4.0485 2.1322 0.0059 -0.0032
R
2
9.7405 16.476 0.0158 0.0460 * 0.4993 1.4606 -0.0020 0.0044
R
2
-8.1796 -11.088 -0.0029 -0.0133 -1.0125 -1.4916 0.0003 -0.0017
R
2




0.1585 0.4876 0.2277 0.2264 0.1282 0.3539 0.1818
Number of Observations 70 69 69 69 70
Number of Terror Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[9.062] [12.84] [0.024]
[10.13] [13.65] [0.027] [0.023]



















- Vote for a Party in the Right Bloc
[12.91] [12.27] [0.039]
















0.3004 0.3043 0.1555 0.1397
Note: Each cell presents the results of a separate OLS regression where the dependent variable is the indicator for future level of terrorism stated at the top of the column. In addition to the respective
proxy for the preferences of the subdistrict's population, columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) include year and subdistrict fixed effects. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) add to the control variables the
subdistricts' averages for age, schooling, schooling interacted with age, expenditures, house density, religiosity and percentage of males, immigrants, individuals coming from former Soviet bloc of
countries, and individuals with an Sephardic ethnicity. Finally, Columns (2) and (6) also control for the subdistricts population size. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict
level, in brackets.  * indicates statistically significant at 10% level,  ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. 








The Effect of Local Political Attitudes on Future Local Levels of Terrorism
[3.146]
Number of Terror Fatalities 
per Capita
Number of Terror Attacks Number of Terror Attacks per 
Capita
(5) (6)








- Support to Granting Territorial Concessions
















0.1861 0.3436 0.2810 0.2971 0.1509 0.1500 0.22930.0446 -0.0750 -0.7426 -0.5017 0.9721 56.9647
0.0059 0.0818 0.1588 0.0320 0.0756 0.0724
0.3701 -0.2245 0.2124 -0.0638 0.6736 120.956
0.0062 0.0821 0.1584 0.0318 0.0768 0.0853
-0.2468 0.0800 0.1669 -1.1040 ** 0.0596 1.0444 **
0.0337 0.0182 0.0564 0.0219 0.0239 0.0224
-0.1522 0.2189 -0.0667 -0.0122 -0.2971 0.3093
0.0337 0.0183 0.0563 0.0208 0.0241 0.0215
Terror Fatalities per Capita Within a Year of the Survey    













Note: Each cell presents the results of a separate OLS regression where the dependent variable appears at the top of each column. In addition to the respective proxy for
the severity of terrorism, all regressions include subdistrics and years fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict-year level, in brackets.
* indicates statistically significant at 10% level,  ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. 
R
2
Number of Observations 6,597 6,597 6,597
[0.46]
Table 15
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on Observable Characteristics of the Subdistricts' Population
R
2
[0.29] [0.25] [0.28] [0.29] [0.26]
6,597
[0.42] [0.45] [0.46] [0.43]
Above 45
Ethnicity
[0.55] [0.24] [0.20] [0.71] [0.27]
R
2
Number of Observations 6,597 6,501 6,518 6,597
[195.6]
Terror Fatalities per Capita Within a Year of the Survey    
R
2
Terror Fatalities per Capita Since Previous Elections









Linear Effect -0.00045 0.0037 *** 0.1295 3.835 ***
Quadratic Effect -0.0001 *** -39.79 ***
Age 0.0167 *** 0.0167 *** 0.0166 *** 0.0168 ***
Age Square -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 ***
Male -0.0144 -0.0155 -0.0140 -0.0155
Years of Schooling 0.0326 *** 0.0326 *** 0.0324 *** 0.0327 ***
Years of Schooling * Age -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0004 ***
Immigrant -0.0201 -0.0191 -0.0189 -0.0184
African-Asian Ethnicity -0.0526 *** -0.0533 *** -0.0525 *** -0.0525 ***
From former Soviet Bloc -0.1178 *** -0.1189 *** -0.1207 *** -0.1207 ***
House Density (persons / rooms) -0.1012 *** -0.1000 *** -0.1025 *** -0.1013 ***
Expenditures (base category - much more than average):
- a little more than average 0.0175 0.0174 0.0183 0.0173
- about average -0.0177 -0.0175 -0.0164 -0.0176
- a little less than average -0.0325 -0.0320 -0.0302 -0.0323
- much less than average -0.0871 *** -0.0864 *** -0.0854 *** -0.0873 ***
Religiosity (base category -  observe all):
-observe a lot 0.0237 0.0259 0.0220 0.0242
- a little observance 0.1161 *** 0.1222 *** 0.1115 *** 0.1176 ***
- secular 0.2220 *** 0.2299 *** 0.2171 *** 0.2245 ***




















Note: Estimated using OLS. Dependent variable is indicator for alternative definition of agreeing to territorial concessions to
Palestinians. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the subdistrict-year level, in brackets. P-Value on effect of
terrorism tests the hypothesis that the joint effect of all proxies for severity of terrorism included in each regression are equal to
zero. * indicates statistically significant at 10% level, ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically
significant at 1% level. 
5,826
0.128 0.129 0.1264 0.128
0.0004 0.0042
Yes
Number of Observations 5,826 5,826 5,826
Yes Yes Yes
















[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]











P-Value on Effect of Terrorism
(4)




Linear Effect 0.0015 0.0020 0.0037 *** 1.969 * 2.287 ** 2.576 ***
Quadratic Effect -0.0000 -0.0000 ** -0.0001 *** -20.58 * -22.90 ** -29.24 ***
Age 0.0072 *** 0.0132 *** 0.0073 *** 0.0134 ***
Age Square -0.0001 * -0.0000 -0.0001 * -0.0000
Male -0.0277 * -0.0136 -0.0300 * -0.0137
Years of Schooling 0.0189 *** 0.0370 *** 0.0190 *** 0.0376 ***
Years of Schooling * Age -0.0004 *** -0.0005 ***
Immigrant -0.0508 ** -0.0514 **
African-Asian Ethnicity -0.0562 *** -0.0553 ***
From former Soviet Bloc -0.1300 *** -0.1285 ***
House Density (persons / rooms) -0.1465 *** -0.1464 ***
Expenditures (base category - much more than average):
- a little more than average 0.0452 * 0.0448 *
- about average -0.0193 -0.0200
- a little less than average -0.0548 * -0.0565 **
- much less than average -0.1080 *** -0.1094 ***
Religiosity (base category -  observe all):
-observe a lot -0.0144 -0.0158
- a little observance 0.0769 * 0.0744 *
- secular 0.1665 *** 0.1632 ***






Note: Estimated using OLS. Dependent variable is indicator for agreeing to territorial concessions to Palestinians. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering
at the subdistrict-year level, in brackets. P-Value on effect of terrorism tests the hypothesis that the joint effect of all proxies for severity of terrorism included in
each regression are equal to zero. * indicates statistically significant at 10% level, ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically
significant at 1% level. 
4,004
0.050 0.072 0.144 0.0504 0.0729 0.1436
Number of Observations
Yes Yes
4,447 4,004 4,529 4,557
Yes Yes






















[0.0029] [0.0096] [0.0029] [0.0096]
[0.0163] [0.0157] [0.0163]
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Individuals Personal Characteristics
[0.0026] [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0026]
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [11.62] [10.56] [9.89]
(6)
Terror Fatalities 12 months before the survey
[0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0014] [1.196] [1.082] [1.006]
0.0166
Appendix Table 2
The Effect of Terror Fatalities on Support for Granting Concessions, from the Elections in 1996 and onwards
Number of Fatalities Fatalities per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.2162 0.1011 P-Value on Effect of Terrorism 0.2969 0.0830 0.0006